Lanham Act Revision Provides Relief for Misleading Comparative Advertisements: Does It Go Too Far? by Gunn, Sherry L.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 68 
Issue 3 Federalist Society Symposium: The Presidency and Congress—Constitutionally 
Separated and Shared Powers 
January 1990 
Lanham Act Revision Provides Relief for Misleading Comparative 
Advertisements: Does It Go Too Far? 
Sherry L. Gunn 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Marketing Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sherry L. Gunn, Lanham Act Revision Provides Relief for Misleading Comparative Advertisements: Does It 
Go Too Far?, 68 WASH. U. L. Q. 707 (1990). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol68/iss3/16 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
NOTES
LANHAM ACT REVISION PROVIDES RELIEF FOR MISLEADING
COMPARATIVE ADVERTISEMENTS:
DOES IT Go Too FAR?
Advertisers choose their words with care, to put their products in the
best possible light without falsely depicting other products so as to sub-
ject themselves to civil liability. A recent revision to the Lanham Trade-
mark Act requires advertisers to choose their words even more carefully,
or face drastic consequences.
The Trademark Law Revision Act,1 expands the federal law of false
advertising by amending Lanham Act section 43(a) to proscribe false or
misleading representations about another's goods, services, or commer-
cial activities.2 The section previously prohibited false representations
only about one's own goods or services.3 The revised section 43(a) effec-
1. Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982
& Supp. 1989).
2. The amended section provides:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for
goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of fact, which-
(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsor-
ship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person,
or
(2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or commer-
cial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or
is likely to be damaged by such act.
Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. section 1125(a) (Supp. 1989).
The revised section 43(a)(1) codifies court interpretations of the previous section 43(a). See Dris-
coll, The "New" 43(a), 79 TRADEMARK REP. 238, 239 (1989) (discussing the codification of judicial
interpretation of § 43(a)). However, this Note is concerned with section 43(a)(2), which creates a
cause of action previously unavailable. See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
3. The former Lanham § 43(a) provided:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or
services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or any false
description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe
or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce, and
any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designation of origin or descrip-
tion or representation cause or procure the same to be transported or used in commerce or
deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by
any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region
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tively creates a federal cause of action for commercial disparagement or
defamation4 arising from comparative advertising.' Because the legisla-
tive history on this particular aspect of the Revision Act is sparse, the
courts are left to decide the extent to which the amended section 43(a)
codifies or rejects the common law of disparagement and defamation;
what types of advertisements are "false" and "misleading" within the
meaning of the statute; and what restraints the first amendment imposes
upon the prima facie elements, defenses, and remedies.
Part One of this Note reviews the history of false advertising under the
Lanham Act. Part Two summarizes the changes in section 43(a). Part
Three examines the first amendment concerns raised by these changes
and recommends an interpretation of the revised section 43(a) consistent
with the statutory language, the policies motivating the revision, and first
amendment requirements.
I. HISTORY OF FALSE ADVERTISING UNDER THE LANHAM ACT
The Lanham Act, originally enacted in 1946,6 repealed-the Trademark
in which said locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be
damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Supp. 1989).
4. The revision is intended to prohibit "a kind of commercial defamation." 134 CONG. REC.
H10411-07 (1988).
5. The amendment affects comparative advertising more significantly than other forms of ad-
vertising because a defendant's representations about another's products are most likely to occur in
the context of a comparative advertisement. "Comparative" advertisements, as used in this Note,
include advertisements in which a competing product or producer is expressly or impliedly identi-
fied. For example, the advertiser might name or picture the competing product or use a phrase such
as "the leading brand" or "the other guy" in a context in which the audience will be able to identify
"the other guy." See Sterk, The Law of Comparative Advertising: How Much Worse is "Better" than
"Great, " 67 TRADEMARK REP. 368, 369 (1977) (There is no "clear line" between comparative and
non-comparative advertisements; all advertising falls "on a continuum ranging from the clearly com-
parative to the exclusively non-comparative.").
Comparative advertisements were not as common when the Lanham Act was enacted in 1946 as
they are today. See Sterk, supra, at 368 & n.2 (tracing the prevalence of comparative advertisements
to a 1960's Avis rental car company "We Try Harder" campaign which implicitly identified the
Hertz rental car company as "Number One"). See also Conlon, ComparativeAdvertising: Whatever
Happened to "Brand X"?, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 407, 407 (1977) (NBC accepted television commer-
cials which identified competitors by name and the Federal Trade Commission asked ABC and CBS
to do the same. (citing Federal Trade Commision News Summary, No. 7-1972 (March 16-31,
1972))); Federal Trade Commission News, No. 1-0320 (March 20, 1972).
6. The Lanham Act was enacted on July 5, 1946. See ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982 & Supp. 1989)).
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Acts of 19057 and 1920.8 The Trademark Act of 1920 allowed a private
cause of action only for false designations of the origin of goods9 made
with intent to deceive.1 ° The Lanham Act significantly expanded the
scope of federal protection against unfair competition." Section 43(a) of
the original Lanham Act allowed plaintiffs to recover for a defendant's
false representations without showing intent to deceive. 2 Further, sec-
tion 43(a) proscribed "any false description or representation" in connec-
tion with "any goods or services," and, therefore, did not appear limited
to claims of false designation of origin.1 3
7. Act of February 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724 (repealed by Lanham Act of 1946, § 46(a),
60 Stat. 444 (1946)).
8. Act of March 19, 1920, ch. 104, 41 Stat. 533 (repealed by Lanham Act of 1946, § 46(a), 60
Stat. 444 (1946)).
9. False designations of origin may be geographic, such as advertising potatoes grown in Mis-
souri as "Idaho potatoes." More commonly, however, a false designation of origin claim involves an
allegation that the defendant is palming off his or her goods as the plaintiff's. For example, the
defendant might use the plaintiff's trademark or a confusingly similar mark on the defendant's prod-
uct, causing consumers to believe that the product originated with the plaintiff. In such a case, the
defendant gains the advantage of the public goodwill associated with the plaintiff's mark, and the
plaintiff may lose sales. If the defendant's product is of inferior quality, the plaintiff's reputation
may be injured. Judge Learned Hand explained the injury caused by false designations of origin by
stating that a merchant's mark:
... carries his name for good or ill. If another uses it, he borrows the owner's reputation,
whose quality no longer lies within his own control. This is an injury, even though the
borrower does not tarnish it, or divert any sales by its use; for a reputation, like a face, is
the symbol of its possessor and creator, and another can use it only as a mask.
Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928).
10. Ch. 104, § 3, 41 Stat. 533 (1920), repealed by Lanham Act, ch. 540, § 46(a), 60 Stat. 444
(1946). Section 3 of the 1920 Trademark Act provided:
That any person who shall wilfully and with intent to deceive, affix, apply, or annex, or use
in connection with any article or articles of merchandise... a false designation or origin
- tending to falsely identify the origin of the merchandise... shall be liable to an action
at law for damages and to an action in-equity for an injunction, at the suit of any person,
firm, or corporation doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin.
Id. Section 3 was criticized for three reasons: proving intent to deceive was too onerous a burden
for plaintiffs to bear; the section applied only to goods, not to services; and the section failed to
proscribe misrepresentations other than false designations of origin. Note, Damage Standards for
False Advertising Under the Lanham Act: A New Trend Emerges, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 125, 130 (1988)
("[A]lmost no decisions can be found in which relief was granted under section 3." (citing Deren-
berg, Federal Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First Decade of the Lanham Act: Prologue or
Epilogue?, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1029, 1034 (1957))).
11. One of the express purposes of the Lanham Act was "to protect persons engaged in [inter-
state] commerce against unfair competition." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982), amended by 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127 (Supp. 1989) (content of intent statement unchanged).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Supp. 1989). For the text of
section 43(a) prior to the 1988 Revision Act, see supra note 3.
13. Id. In addition, the original Lanham Act allowed recovery "by any person who believes
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The courts, however, hesitated to interpret section 43(a) liberally.1 4
For example, in Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp.,15 the Ninth
Circuit refused to allow a cause of action for an alleged misrepresentation
that did not involve a false claim that the defendant's product originated
with the plaintiff.16 The plaintiffs, trustees of Samuel Clemens' estate,
claimed all rights possessed by Mark Twain at his death.1 7 The com-
plaint alleged that the defendant produced a motion picture facetiously
representing Mark Twain as its author."8 The plaintiffs did not allege
that the defendant promoted the movie as Mark Twain's, but that the
association of Twain's name with the defendant's "corny" production
detracted from the fame of Twain's name and injured the plaintiffs' abil-
ity to sell Twain's works.19 The court held that the plaintiffs failed to
state a cause of action under section 43(a) because they did not allege
that the defendant appropriated their property rights by palming offl° its
movie as Twain's.21
Section 43(a) received a broader interpretation in L'Aiglon Apparel,
that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation," Id.
The 1920 Act allowed recovery only by persons in the locality falsely designated. See supra note 10.
Although courts face some difficulty in determining who may recover under the "is likely to be
damaged" standard, Congress did not disturb this language in the 1988 revision. See Thompson,
Consumer Standing Under Section 43(a): More Legislative History, More Confusion, 79 TRADE-
MARK REP. 341, 341 (1989) (the legislative history contains "a wealth of conflicting statements on
the question of consumer standing"). See also J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPE-
TITON § 27:4 (2d ed. 1984 and Supp. 1989) (discussing standing under § 43(a)). Because the revi-
sion did not change the relevant statutory language, this Note does not attempt to resolve the issue.
14. See Keller, Private Regulation ofAdvertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 2 1985
ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 563, 566 (1985) (§ 43(a) was not used aggressively to combat false advertising
for ten years).
15. 186 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1951).
16. Id. at 925.
17. Id. at 923.
18. Id. at 924.
19. Id.
20. See supra note 9.
21. Id. at 925. See also Samson Crane Co. v. Union National Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp 218 (D.
Mass. 1949), aff'd per curiam, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950). In Samson Crane, the district court
refused to allow a cause of action under section 43(a) in the absence of an allegation that the defend-
ant falsely represented that its product originated with the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff and defendant
operated retail clothing stores in Massachusetts. Id. The plaintiff complained that the defendant
falsely represented that its stores were operated by an international union. Id. at 220. The court
held that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because there was no misrepresentation about
the goods themselves, and because the defendant had not attempted to palm off its goods as the
plaintiff's. Id. at 221-22. The court reasoned that Congress intended to proscribe only unfair com-
petition closely akin to common law palming off. Id. at 222.
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Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc.2 2 In L'Aiglon, the Third Circuit allowed a cause
of action without an allegation of palming off.23 The plaintiff alleged that
the defendant's advertisements pictured a dress manufactured by the
plaintiff, when the defendant actually sold an inferior dress.24 The court
noted that the language of the statute was clear and precise,25 and did not
require palming off.
26
Although the L'Aiglon decision expanded the reach of section 43(a),
courts still did not interpret the section to prohibit all false representa-
tions. Until the Revision Act, the statute required that the defendant
cause the falsely represented goods or services "to be transported or used
in commerce."27 Because a seller usually does not cause a competitor's
goods to move in commerce, misrepresentations the seller made about
another's goods were not prohibited by former section 43(a). For exam-
ple, in Bernard Food Industries v. Dietene Co.,28 the defendant, Dietene,
prepared a chart comparing its custard mix to the plaintiff's custard
mix.29 The chart contained erroneous data regarding the plaintiff's mix,
but accurately described the defendant's mix.3 0 The Seventh Circuit held
that because the case involved only disparagment of a plaintiff's product
and the defendant made no false representations about its own product,
the plaintiff could not recover under section 43(a). 1l Despite sharp criti-
cism, 32 courts consistently followed Bernard and refused to apply former
22. 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954).
23. Id. at 650.
24. Id. The plaintiff's concern was that consumers seeing the defendant's advertisement, which
offered a dress for $6.95 and pictured the dress the plaintiff advertised for $17.95, would believe that
the plaintiff was charging an exorbitant price, when in fact the defendant was selling a different and
inferior dress. Id. This was not palming off because the defendant used its own name in the adver-
tisement, and did not represent that it was selling plaintiff's dress. Id.
25. Id. at 651. For the text of the former section 43(a), see supra note 3.
26. 214 F.2d at 651.
27. See supra note 3. This limitation stems from the Lanham Act's primary emphasis on trade-
mark infringement and closely related forms of unfair competition, such as false designations of
origin. In cases of infringement and false designations of origin, it is the defendant's product which
bears the infringing mark or false designation. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
28. 415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969), cert denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970).
29. Id. at 1280. Dietene's chemist analyzed Dietene's egg custard mix and Bernard's eggless
custard mix, and prepared the chart, which was distributed to five of Dietene's executive and admin-
istrative employees and perhaps nine of its thirty-two salesmen. Id. at 1280-81.
30. When he made the chart, the Dietene chemist did not know that Bernard also manufac-
tured an egg custard mix, and therefore, the chart did not accurately represent Bernard's product.
Id. at 1280.
31. Id. at 1283.
32. See, eg., Marx, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Statutory Cause of Action for False
1990]
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section 43(a) to false representations about a plaintiff's product.33
Responding to criticism of the Bernard rule, Congress revised section
43(a)34 to create a federal cause of action for commercial defamation.35
The revised section prohibits misrepresentations about "another person's
goods, services, or commercial activities. '3 6 Because the revision specifi-
cally regulates representations made in "commercial advertising or pro-
motion about another's product," the amendment significantly expands
the federal law of comparative advertising.37 The amendment proscribes
"misleading" representations as well as false ones, an addition which fur-
ther expands protection under section 43(a).38
II. THE REVISED SECTION 43(A)
A. The Influence of Common Law Defamation and Disparagement
The legislative history of the Revision Act indicates that the amend-
ments were intended in part to create a federal cause of action for com-
mercial defamation. 39  However, the statute also prohibits claims
previously actionable as commercial disparagement. The principal dis-
Advertising, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 383, 408-09 (1983) ("A false statement by the defendant
about a plaintiff's product has the same detrimental effect as a false statement about the defendant's
goods. Both tend to mislead the buyer about the qualities of the goods and their relative merits.").
In 1988, the United States Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission criticized Ber-
nard's "tortured interpretation" of section 43(a). The Commission stated:
Section 43(a) is a broadly remedial section which extends deeply into false advertising. It is
difficult to justify on policy grounds denying protection to a manufacturer whose business
is being injured by clearly false and disparaging representations about its products. It is
even more difficult to justify the public deception and disruption of fair competition that
would almost certainly result.
United States Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission, Report and Recommenda-
tion on the United States Trade System and the Lanham Act, 251 PLI/Pat 95 (1988). See also note
4 and accompanying text.
33. Note, Damages Standards for False Advertising Under the Lanham Act: A New Trend
Emerges, 20 RuTGERs LJ. 125, 137 (1988) (no court has held disparagement of a plaintiff's product
actionable under § 43(a)). In cases in which the misrepresentations concern the plaintiff's product,
the plaintiff might pursue a disparagement action under state law.
34. See S. R P. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1988). (Bernard rule is "illogical on both
practical and public policy levels ... ").
35. 134 CONG. REc. H10,411-07 (1988).
36. See supra note 2.
37. Id. See Kobak & Fleck, Commercial Defamation Claim Added to Revised Lanham Act,
Nat'l L.J., October 30, 1989, at 33, 35 col. 2 (predicting that this "major" amendment may produce
a deluge of claims). See infra note 96.
38. For a discussion of the meaning of "misleading" as used in the revised section 43(a), see
infra notes 50-71 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 4.
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tinction between the two torts is that commercial disparagement is a false
statement denigrating the quality of goods, whereas commercial defama-
tion is a false statement imputing fraud, deceit, dishonesty, or other mor-
ally reprehensible conduct to the producer of goods.' The revised
section 43(a) incorporates both concepts by proscribing misrepresenta-
tions about the "nature, characteristics, (or] qualities" of "goods, services
or commercial activities."41 Misrepresentations about goods or services
are the essence of disparagement, and misrepresentations about commer-
cial activities may be actionable as defamation. 2
The inclusion of "commercial activities" in the Act may cover more
than traditional defamation claims.43 The Act's coverage is not limited
to statements imputing morally reprehensible conduct to another; con-
ceivably, even a misrepresentation imputing morally neutral or laudatory
conduct to another is actionable if misleading or false.'
40. See, eg., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1259
(D. Mass. 1981) ("Defamation of a corporation injures the reputation of the corporation itself, while
product disparagement injures the reputation of its products."), rev'd on other grounds, 692 F.2d 189
(1st Cir. 1982), aff'd 466 U.S. 485 (1984). The Bose court noted that comments which disparage a
product often defame the producer as well. 508 F. Supp. at 1259. In Bose, the disparaging statement
appeared in a Consumer Reports magazine article which compared Bose's loudspeaker to other
brands and asserted that instruments heard through Bose's speaker seemed to wander "about the
room." 466 U.S. at 490. A more accurate description of the sound heard through the speakers was
that it tended to wander "along the wall." Id. The Supreme Court decided that Bose could not
recover for the disparagement because it failed to demonstrate that Consumers Union made the
statement with actual malice. Id. at 511. See infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text. See also
Allen Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 224 A.D. 187, 229 N.Y.S. 692 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928) (allowing action for
disparagement and dishonest business practices when the defendant distributed pamphlets, falsely
represented to be reports of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which falsely described the qualities
of the plaintiff's So-Bos-So fly spray for cattle).
41. See supra note 2.
42. See supra note 40.
43. For example, a plaintiff in a section 43(a) action will have to prove only that a representa-
tion is misleading, while a plaintiff in a defamation action must prove that a representation is false.
44. For example, some businesses advertise "no-frills" service, and emphasize that they do not
provide the "extras" their competitors do, and therefore do not have to charge a high price. Even if
the advertiser does not expressly state that the competitor overcharges for the extras, the competitor
who does not provide such extras or who does not charge any more for them may have a cause of
action under the revised section 43(a).
This view is consistent with the Federal Trade Commission's rule that giving a consumer a differ-
ent product than the one represented is deceptive even if the substitute is more valuable and of better
quality. See FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934) (affirming FTC's finding of deception
for mislabeling "California white pine," a type of yellow pine, as "white pine" despite Algoma's
argument that its California white pine was not inferior to genuine white pine and saved the con-
sumer money). The Court explained, "Fair competition is not attained by balancing a gain in money
against a misrepresentation of the thing supplied." The Court also stated, "The public is entitled to
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The revision also alters the common law pleading requirement for dis-
paragement and defamation. A plaintiff in a common law disparagement
action must allege and prove: the statement denigrating her goods is
false; the defendant made the statement with actual malice; and the
plaintiff suffered special damages.45 A plaintiff in a common law defama-
tion action must establish only that the defendant made a false statement
imputing reprehensible conduct to the plaintiff in the production of his or
her goods. 46 The plaintiff's burden of pleading and proof is less stringent
under the Revision Act.47 According to the revised section 43(a), the
plaintiff is entitled to relief upon a showing that the defendant made a
false or misleading commercial misrepresentation of the plaintiff's goods,
services or commercial activities, and that the plaintiff "believes that he
or she is or is likely to be damaged."'48 The plaintiff need not show that
the defendant acted with any culpable mental state,49 or that the misrep-
get what it chooses, though the choice may be dictated by caprice or by fashion or perhaps by
ignorance." Id. at 78.
45. C. MCMANIS, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES IN A NUTSHELL 336 (1988).
46. Id. at 330-31. See also 3. NOWACK, R. ROTUNDA & J.N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 16.33 at 931 (3d ed. 1986).
47. Kobak & Fleck, Commercial Defamation Claim Added to Revised Lanham Act, NAT'L L.J.,
October 30, 1989, at 33, 35 col. 1. (Under the revised § 43(a), "special damages, such as lost sales or
lost customers, need not be pleaded or proved.").
48. Lanham Act § 43(a) 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Supp. 1989). See supra note 2 for the text of the
revised section 43(a). See also supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the belief that one is
or is likely to be damaged).
49. However, according to judicial interpretation of former section 43(a), a rebuttable presump-
tion of actual consumer confusion arises if the defendant intended to confuse consumers. In My-T-
Fine Corp. v. Samuels, 69 F.2d 76, 77 (2d Cir. 1934), Judge Learned Hand stated, "[A] latecomer
who deliberately copies the dress of his competitors already in the field, must at least prove that his
effort has been futile .... He may indeed succeed in showing that it was; that however bad his
purpose, it will fall in execution; if he does, he will win .... But such an intent raises a presumption
that customers will be deceived." Accord Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 281
F.2d 755, 760 (2d Cir. 1960). See also U-Haul International, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034,
1041 (9th Cir. 1986) (consumer deception presumed when defendant spent substantial funds on its
advertising campaign designed to influence the public). Compare Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your
Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956) (intent to deceive is a factor in determining the
likelihood of confusion). See also Preston & Richards, Consumer Miscomprehension and Deceptive
Advertising: A Response to Professor Craswell, 68 B.U.L. REv. 431, 437 (1988) ("[Advertisers] are
professionals in communication. We suspect that when their copy is obscure, it is because they have
deliberately attempted to engender miscomprehension.").
A showing of actual consumer confusion, through the defendant's failure to rebut the presumption
of confusion raised by intentional misconduct, or through the plaintiff's independent evidence of
confusion, entitles the plaintiff to monetary relief. Hesmer Foods, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 346
F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 839 (1965); Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking
Co., 255 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1958).
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resentations imputed morally reprehensible conduct to the plaintiff.
B. False or Misleading Representations
Although former section 43(a) prohibited only "false" representations,
the Revision Act proscribes "misleading" representations as well.50
"Misleading" is not defined by the Revision Act.51 Therefore, courts in-
terpreting the revised section 43(a) must define the scope of the statute's
language.52 Material omissions and inadequately substantiated claims
may fall within the meaning of "misleading."
50. See supra notes 2 and 3 for the texts of the revised and former statutes.
51. In construing "misleading," courts are likely to consider the meaning given to "deceptive"
under the Federal Trade Commission Act 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) & (2) (1988), because this statute has
long been used to regulate advertising. To determine whether an advertisement is deceptive, the
Federal Trade Commission considers the net impression the ad creates and whether the impression
conveys a "material representation.., that is likely to mislead the consumer.., acting reasonably in
the circumstances." Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Koven v. FTC, No. 84-5337 (11th Cir. Oct. 10, 1984). Prior to Cliffdale, the FTC found advertise-
ments deceptive if the net impression created by the advertisement had the capacity to deceive even
"ignorant... unthinking and... credulous" consumers. Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co.,
178 F.2d 73, 75 (1910); Charles of the Ritz Distributors Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 679 (2d Cir.
1944).
An application of the net impression test may be found in P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52
(4th Cir. 1950). The FTC found a likelihood that consumers would be misled by Lorillard's adver-
tised assertion that Reader's Digest magazine ranked Lorillard's Old Gold brand cigarettes lowest in
nicotine content of cigarettes tested by the magazine. Id. at 57-58. Although Reader's Digest re-
ported that Old Gold cigarettes had the lowest nicotine content, the article concluded that the differ-
ences in nicotine content were insignificant and should not serve as the basis for choosing one brand
of cigarettes over another. Id. at 57. The FTC found Lorillard's advertisement deceptive because it
created the impression that the magazine article recommended the cigarettes. Id. at 58. See also
FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933) (respondents, who did not actually grind wheat into
flour, were ordered to cease using "milling" in their name absent a disclaimer that the company did
not grind grain).
For clarity, this Note will regard "false" claims as those which a plaintiff can demonstrate to be
literally untrue while "misleading" will include some statements which are not demonstrably false.
52. The ordinary meaning of "misleading" seems to encompass an intent to deceive or causing
actual deception. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 902 (5th ed. 1979) ("misleading" defined as
"[d]elusive; calculated to lead astray or to lead into error"); WEBSTER's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY
479 (concise ed. 1974) (mislead defined as "1. to lead in a wrong direction; lead astray. 2. to deceive
or delude. 3. to lead into wrongdoing."). Courts construing the revised section 43(a) will have to
decide whether "misleading" requires that consumers are actually misled, or only that consumers
are likely to be misled. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. Under the former section
43(a), the standard for injunctive relief was likelihood of confusion. See supra note 49. Congress
codified the likelihood of confusion standard in the revised section 43(a)(1), but did not codify a
"likelihood" standard for section 43(a)(2), the subsection dealing with comparative advertising. See
supra note 2. The omission implies that consumers must actually be misled before a plaintiff can
obtain relief. However, because Congress did not explain how courts should interpret "misleading,"
courts should continue to apply a "likelihood" test.
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1. Material Omissions
Under former section 43(a), courts generally refused to allow a cause
of action for a defendant's failure to disclose a fact material to a con-
sumer's purchase decision because an omission is not a "representation"
and is not "false," and therefore was not prohibited by the former stat-
ute. 3 During review of the Lanham Act revisions, the Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary deleted a provision expressly creating a cause of
action for material omissions. The Committee deleted the provision due
to concern over the heavy burden it would place on advertisers required
to disclose all facts important to consumers' purchase decisions in every
advertisement, and because the Committee concluded that the courts
should decide whether omissions are actionable.54 However, by adding
the word "misleading" to section 43(a), Congress may have opened the
door to actions based on failure to disclose material facts because an ad-
vertiser's failure to reveal material facts can convey a misleading impres-
sion of the advertised goods or services.55
53. For example, in McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home Products Corp., 501 F. Supp. 517, 521
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), the defendants advertised that Anacin contained "the pain reliever doctors recom-
mend most" without revealing that the pain reliever was aspirin. The omission did not violate sec-
tion 43(a). Id. at 532. In contrast, the same omission violated § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988). American Home Products Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 689 (3d Cir.
1982). The different results may be explained by the difference in the language and purposes of the
statutes. The former section 43(a) prohibited false representations, not omissions, while section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits deceptive acts or practices. Further, the Lanham Act
is designed primarily to insure fair competition while the Federal Trade Commission Act is designed
to protect consumers as well. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988) (Lanham Act intended "to protect per-
sons engaged in [interstate] commerce against unfair competition"); see also H.R. REP. No. 1613,
75th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1937) (The Wheeler-Lea amendment, which added the phrase "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices" to § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, ma[de] the consumer, who
may be injured by an unfair trade practice, of equal concern, before the law, with the merchant or
manufacturer injured by the unfair methods of a dishonest competitor.").
54. S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 41, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEws 5603-04.
55. See supra note 53. The Committee left resolution of the issue to the courts. Id. at 41, 1988
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5604 ("It is the committee's intention that... misrepresenta-
tions resulting from omissions ... should continue to be decided on a case-by-case basis, and that
[the deletion] should not be regarded as either limiting or extending applicable decisional law.").
Even if not literally false, an omission can still mislead. See supra note 53. Despite the broader
language, however, courts may still conclude that omissions are not representations. See supra note
53 and accompanying text. The Federal Trade Commission identified three district types of omis-
sions in In re International Harvester, 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984). The FTC ruled that it is deceptive to
"tell only half the truth, and to omit the rest," when the failure to disclose creates a "misleading
impression." Id. at 1057. In addition, it is deceptive to "simply remain silent ... under circum-
stances that constitute an implied but false representation." Id. at 1058. However, "pure omis-
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Because the revised section 43(a) prohibits misleading representations
about a plaintiff's product as well as a defendant's, determining whether
an omission is actionable will be difficult. Courts will have to decide
what the defendant must disclose in a comparative advertisement about a
competitor's product as well as about its own.56 To avoid this difficulty,
one solution is for courts to disallow all claims of omissions under section
43(a).57 Another solution is to allow a cause of action under 43(a) when
the omission of a material fact so affects the impression created by the
advertisement that it is tantamount to a misrepresentation.5"
2. Lack of Substantiation
Because former section 43(a) proscribed false, as opposed to merely
unsubstantiated, representations, courts generally refused to award relief
to plaintiffs alleging only that the defendant did not provide scientific or
other reasonable support for her claims.59 However, some courts inter-
sions," i.e., silence "in circumstances that do not give any particular meaning to [the] silence," are
not deceptive. Id. at 1059.
56. For example, a restaurant may wish to advertise that its medium pizza costs $10.00 while
its competitor's medium pizza costs $12.00. Must the restaurant disclose that the competitor's price
includes two toppings or that the competitor's pizza is an inch larger in diameter? Even if such facts
are important to a consumer, it seems quite plausible that the advertiser might not be aware of them,
or, if aware of them, might not think they are important. Knowledge of the false or misleading
nature of the representation is not required for a § 43(a) violation. See supra note 2. The advertiser
might decide to abandon the comparative advertisement rather than risk liability for failing to dis-
close facts she did not know or did not recognize as significant. See infra notes 118-120 and accom-
panying text.
57. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 55.
59. Morrison, The Emerging Burden of Proof Rule in Drug Advertising Cases, 78 TRADEMARK
REP. 551, 554 (1988) (citing U-Haul International, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1238, 1248;
212 USPQ 49, 57 (D. Ariz. 1981), aff'd 681 F.2d 1159, 216 USPQ 1077 (9th Cir. 1982) ("U-Haul
.. could not sustain its burden of persuasion by its repeated assertions (and proof) that Jartran had
done little, if any, testing of Jartran trucks or trailers, and no comparative testing of U-Haul prod-
ucts."); Toro Co. v. Textron, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 241, 253, 208 USPQ 612, 622 (D. Del. 1980) ("The
plain language of [s]ection 43(a), which prohibits false rather than unsubstantiated representations,
requires that a plaintiff establish not merely that the defendant's claim lacks substantiation, but also
that it is false or deceptive.").
The FTC prohibits advertisements which make express or implied claims about a product's per-
formance or efficacy if the advertiser made the claim without a reasonable basis for its accuracy. In
American Home Products v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 684, 702-03 (3d Cir. 1982), the FTC issued a cease
and desist order against AHP for an advertisement which stated that Anacin contained more of the
most effective pain reliever than other brands. The claim was literally true; Anacin actually con-
tained more of the most effective pain reliever, aspirin, than other brands. Id. However, no scientific
studies proved that a larger dose of aspirin relieved pain faster or more effectively than the smaller
dose used in other brands. Id. Because AHP could not prove that the implied claim of more effec-
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preting the former section 43(a) adopted the Federal Trade Commis-
sion's (FTC's) rule that inadequately substantiated advertising claims are
deceptive.' In Upjohn Co. v. Riohom Corp.,61 the defendant, Riohom,
advertised its product, Rivixil, as a cosmetic and hair growth product
that was clinically tested and "shown to be safe."' 62 Upjohn, which also
manufactured a hair growth product, obtained a preliminary injunction
against dissemination of the advertisement because no scientific tests
demonstrated that Rivixil was a cosmetic or did anything other than
stimulate hair growth, and because Riohom's clinical safety tests were
flawed.63 Although few courts apply the lack of substantiation standard
to section 43(a) claims,64 the Upjohn opinion may indicate a trend toward
acceptance of the substantiation standard, at least in cases involving
over-the-counter drugs.65
According to the FTC's standard, if an advertiser lacks a reasonable
basis for a performance claim at the time it is made, the claim violates
the Federal Trade Commission Act even if the advertiser can later prove
its literal truth.66 The FTC reasons that the advertiser who makes a per-
tive pain relief was supported by competent scientific studies, the FTC found the advertisement
deceptive. Id.
60. Morrison, supra note 59, at 555-56.
61. 641 F. Supp. 1209, 1 USPQ 2d 1433 (D. Del. 1986).
62. Id. at 1223, 1 USPQ 2d at 1442.
63. Id. at 1223-24, 1 USPQ 2d at 1442-43. Specifically, Riohom tested only fifty-nine subjects
and used a different concentration of the active ingredient minoxidil, which was used in Rivixil. Id.
64. Morrison, supra note 59, at 559. It is important to distinguish cases in which the defend-
ant's test proves that the defendant's claim is false (e.g., the advertiser claims that its product works
faster than any other, but the study shows that another product is equally fast) from cases in which
the defendant's test simply fails to prove that the claim is true (e.g., the advertiser claims that its
product works faster than any other, but the study did not test all brands). In the first type of case,
the plaintiff can demonstrate falsity by using the defendant's test as evidence. In the second, the
plaintiff must introduce other evidence of falsity unless the court is willing to shift the burden of
proving substantiation to the defendant.
65. See Morrison, supra note 59, at 555-59. Claims of inadequate substantiation are particu-
larly potent when the safety or performance of over-the-counter drugs are involved because consum-
ers lack the resources or knowledge to personally verify claims about drug products, and because the
inherent health and safety risks posed by unsubstantiated claims of a drug's safety or performance
are very great. See, eg., American Home Products v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982) (concern for
consumer safety a significant factor), To protect consumers of over-the-counter drugs, and perhaps
other products, courts may be willing to implicitly shift the burden of proof in section 43(a) cases by
requiring a defendant to demonstrate a reasonable basis for the claim rather than requiring the
plaintiffto establish falsity. Morrison, supra note 59 at 559 ("Even in non-drug cases a strong policy
argument can be made that the defendant be required to substantiate its advertising claims.").
66. Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972) ([t]o meet the requirement of a reasonable basis for a claim,
an advertiser must actually rely upon competent, well-controlled scientific tests conducted prior to
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formance or safety claim implies that the claim is substantiated by com-
petent tests.67 When the claim is not adequately substantiated, the
consumer is misled about whether the claim is substantiated rather than
about the truth of the safety or performance claim itself.6
Whether inadequately substantiated representations fall within the lan-
guage of the revised section 43(a) is open to debate.69 The former sec-
tion, proscribing "any false description or representation," could be
interpreted to include implied claims of substantiation. In contrast, the
revised section 43(a) proscribes any false or misleading description or
representation of fact which "misrepresents the nature, characteristics
[or] qualities of goods, services, or commercial activities."70 Whether a
performance or safety claim is substantiated does not seem to concern
the nature, characteristics, or qualities of goods or services. However, a
plaintiff might argue that a defendant's scientific research is a "commer-
cial activit[y]" covered by the statute, and that the adequacy of the re-
search relates to the nature, characteristics, or quality of the activity.71
C. Another Person's Goods, Services or Commercial Activities
In revising section 43(a), Congress intended to provide a cause of
action for plaintiffs whose products are misrepresented in others' adver-
tisements. 72 To accomplish this goal, Congress prohibited misrepresen-
tations about "another person's goods, services or commercial
making the advertising claim.). Pfizer found a lack of substantiation unfair, but it might also be
considered deceptive.
67. Id. Substantiation claims may be express ("Studies show that our product works the fast-
est") or implied ("Our product works the fastest"). See Morrison, supra note 59, at 559 (urging that
express and implied establishment claims should be actionable under § 43(a)).
68. Id.
69. The legislative history is silent on this issue.
70. For the text of the statute, see supra note 2.
71. Congress did not define "commercial activities," and it is not clear whether the phrase
covers all aspects of a business enterprise. If a company pays an independent research laboratory to
design and perform tests for its products, it does not seem that the independent research is part of
the advertiser's commercial activities.
If competitors are not directly injured by an advertiser's lack of substantiation, allowing such
actions are beyond the purpose of section 43(a). See supra note 11. However, manufacturers who
expend substantial funds on adequate research may have to charge more for their products than
those who do not conduct competent research, and therefore, advertisers who conduct research are
indirectly injured by their competitors' lack of research. On the other hand, the advertiser who
conducts research can disclose this fact in the advertisement, making his or her product appear more
reliable and, therefore, worth a higher price.
72. See supra notes 4, 32-35 and accompanying text.
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activities. ' 73 However, Congress did not indicate whether the defendant
must specifically identify the plaintiff's product in the advertisement, or
whether a misrepresentation directed generally at competitors' products
allows all competitors to recover. 74 Because of the potential size of dam-
age awards under section 43(a),"7 allowing recovery to every competitor
seems harsh. However, the statute provides that any plaintiff who be-
lieves that he is likely to be injured 76 is entitled to relief.
Under the former section 43(a), courts generally allowed injunctive re-
lief upon a showing that consumer confusion was likely, and awarded
monetary damages only upon a showing of actual confusion.77 Because
Congress did not express an intent to modify this rule, courts will proba-
bly continue to apply it to cases arising under the revised section 43(a).
Under such a standard, if a defendant's misrepresentations refer gener-
ally to competitors, injunctive relief is available upon a showing that con-
sumers are likely to be misled; monetary damages are available only upon
a showing that consumers were actually misled.7"
D. Commercial Advertising or Promotion
The revised section 43(a) proscribes only misrepresentations made in
commercial advertising or promotion.79 This limitation arose from Con-
gress' desire to avoid constraints imposed by the first amendment.8" Be-
cause commercial speech receives minimal first amendment protection,
73. For the text of the statute, see supra note 2.
74. An advertiser could compare her product to a limited class of competing products, such as
"the other leading brands."
75. See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
76. Courts construe the "belief of injury" language to require a plaintiff to show "a reasonable
basis for the belief that... [he] is likely to be damaged as a result of the false advertising." Vidal
Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272, 278 (2d Cir. 1981). Accord Coca-Cola Co. v.
Tropicana Products, Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 316 (2d Cir. 1982); Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace,
Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 191 (2d Cir. 1980). See also supra note 13.
77. Note, Damage Standards for False Advertising Under the Lanham Act: A New Trend
Emerges, 20 RtTGERS L.J. 135, 141 (1988). The rule provides relief for all violations, but allows
monetary relief only when monetary injury is most likely-when consumers are actually confused.
However, actual confusion is presumed when the defendant acts intentionally. See supra note 49 and
accompanying text. Therefore, monetary awards may be available even if the plaintiff cannot
demonstrate that confusion occurred.
78. The additional element of a reasonable belief of injury also helps to guard against windfall
awards to uninjured plaintiffs. See infra notes 127-34 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 2.
80. 134 CONG. REc. S16973 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (statement of Senator DeConcini).
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the provision avoids some consitutional concerns."
The language also limits the section's scope. Apparently, a competi-
tor's statements outside the advertising or promotional context are not
regulated by the revised section. 2
E. Strict Liability for Violation; Media Innocent Violation Defense
The former section 43(a) did not require any culpable mental state for
liability. 3 The amendment retains strict liability,14 but alters the sec-
tion's treatment of transporters and media defendants.
Under the former statute, a defendant who did not make the false rep-
resentation, but who moved misrepresented goods in commerce, was lia-
ble only if the defendant acted with knowledge of the falsity of the
misrepresentation.85 This provision no longer exists in the revised sec-
tion 43(a). Transporters are now subject to strict liability along with
other defendants. However, the amendment imposes liability only on a
defendant who "uses" the misrepresentation in commerce.86 This change
may entirely exclude liability for merely moving the product in com-
merce. However, if transporting goods may be considered "use" of the
misrepresentation, transporters are subject to strict liability for that use.
The Revision Act expressly provides an innocent violation defense for
some defendants.8 7 Under the amended section 43(a), a media defendant
or other defendant "engaged solely in the business of printing the...
81. The Senate retained the limiting language "in order to eliminate House fears." Senator
DeConcini expressed the view that the phrase was "intended only to eliminate any possibility that
the language might be applied to political speech" and that "nonprofit organizations would be as
liable for misrepresentations as profit organizations." 134 CONG. REc. S16973 (daily ed. Oct. 20,
1988) (statement of Senator DeConcini). As the Senator's comment suggests, even nonprofit organi-
zations advertise to raise funds or promote their views.
Although the intent to exclude political speech is clear, no mention is made of religious speech.
Religious speech is probably excluded, however, because a misrepresentation must concern goods,
services, or commercial activities to violate section 43(a), the advertisements of nonprofit groups are
affected only if the group engages in such commercial activities as selling goods or services.
82. Section 43(a)(1) still covers language used on product labels. See supra note 2. However,
statements issued only to employees, or some other group outside a promotional context, such as the
statements at issue in the Bernard case, are apparently outside the revision's scope. See supra note
28-30 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 3. However, Courts generally held that a willful misrepresentation raised a
rebuttable presumption of actual consumer confusion. See supra note 49. The revision did not
change this rule.
84. See supra note 2.
85. See supra note 3.
86. See supra note 2.
87. The defense appears in Lanham Act § 32(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) (Supp. 1989).
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violating matter for others [who] establishes that he or she was an...
innocent violator" is subject only to an injunction."8 Therefore, inno-
cence is an affirmative defense which limits the plaintiff's remedies, but
does not excuse a media defendant from liability.
F Remedies
Prior to the revision, section 43(a) did not expressly provide for mone-
tary remedies.89 Courts, however, awarded monetary damages and in-
junctive relief without explicit statutory authority.90 The revision
codified and expanded case law, making the following remedies available:
injunctions, treble damages, defendant's profits, destruction of violating
matter, costs, and attorney's fees in exceptional cases. 91 Although the
remedies are designed to be compensatory rather than punitive,92 the
large awards,93 strict liability,94 and no'requirement of actual injury95
make the revised section 43(a) very attractive to plaintiffs attacked by a
competitor's advertisements. 96
88. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) (Supp. 1989). Placing the burden of proving innocence on the defend-
ant, and imposing an injunction even on those who can prove their innocence, creates first amend-
ment concerns. See infra notes 114-121 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 3. Lanham Act sections for remedies were limited to remedies for infringe-
ment of registered trademarks. See Lanham Act §§ 34-36, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116-1118 (1982), codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116-1118 (Supp. 1989).
90. Driscoll, The "New" 43(a), 79 TRADEMARK REP. 238, 244 (1989) (courts awarded reme-
dies, but circuits split over whether attorney's fees could be awarded).
91. Lanham Act §§ 34-36, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (Supp. 1989).
92. Lanham Act § 34(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (Supp. 1989).
93. See, eg., U-Haul International, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1986) (sus-
taining award of forty million dollars under former § 43(a)).
94. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 37. Commentators warn that predatory use of the statute could drive some
defendants out of business, or cause some advertisers to refrain from comparative or other informa-
tional advertising. See Comment, Monetary Relieffor False Advertising Claims Arising Under Sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 953, 973-74 (1982). Such behavior vitiates the
statute's purpose of promoting competition, and ultimately injures consumers. Monetary remedies
for corrective advertising favor large businesses, which can afford to pay for corrective advertising.
Smaller competitors may be driven out of business if they are unable to pay for such corrective
advertising. Comment, supra, at 973-74 (commenting on U-Haul International, Inc., v, Jartran,
Inc., 793 F.2d 1034, 1037, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 1986) (Jartran ordered to pay the amount it spent on its
advertising plus the amount U-Haul spent on corrective advertising, rounded to the nearest million
and doubled for a total judgment of forty million dollars plus attorney's fees)).
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III. FIRST AMENDMENT CONSTRAINTS ON THE
REVISED SECTION 43(A)
Although Congress intended to avoid first amendment constraints on
the revised section 43(a) by limiting its scope to commercial advertising
or promotion,97 some commercial speech is constitutionally protected.9
By regulating misleading as well as false speech, the new section 43(a)
raises first amendment concerns.99 To the extent misleading comparative
advertisements are consitutionally protected, courts must formulate the
standard of protection that is to apply."°
A. First Amendment Protection of Commercial Speech
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council,10' the Supreme Court recognized that commercial speech is not
completely outside first amendment protection.1 "2 The Court noted that
commercial speech provides useful information to consumers 10 3 by in-
creasing their awareness of the products available in the market." 4 Ad-
vertisements discussing the specific attributes of the advertised product
lead to more informed purchase decisions. 105 In addition to increasing
consumer awareness, commercial speech enhances competition by spur-
ring competitors to charge prices comparable to those advertised by
others or to offer comparable goods or services.' 0 6 The Court concluded
that the first amendment protects commercial speech. 10 7 However, the
97. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
98. See infra notes 114-121 and accompanying text. U.S. CONST., amend. I provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of grievances.
99. See infra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 122-42 and accompanying text.
101. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
102. The Court defines commercial speech as "speech which does 'no more than propose a com-
mercial transaction.'" Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n., 413
U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
103. Id. at 765.
104. Id. The Court stated, "Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem,
is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for
what reason, and at what price." Id.
105. Id. The Court stated that the "free flow of commercial information is indispensable" when
it contains facts upon which to base "private economic decisions." Id.
106. When competitors' prices vary significantly, "information as to who is charging what be-
comes more than a convenience." Id. at 764.
107. The Court emphasized the consumer's right to receive commercial speech as well as the
advertiser's right to disseminate commercial speech. Id. at 756 ("[Tlhe protection afforded [by the
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Court decided that commercial speech should receive a lower degree of
protection than non-commercial speech because commercial speech lacks
the expressive significance of religious, political, or other ideological
speech.10 8 Moreover, because potential profits are a significant incentive
to engage in commercial speech, the Court reasoned that commercial
speech is less likely to be chilled by fear of sanction than other forms of
speech. 109
1. The First Amendment and Comparative Advertising
Comparative commercial speech may deserve greater protection than
other forms of commercial speech. Courts should determine the level of
protection with reference to whether the rationale for protecting com-
mercial speech is served. Comparative advertisements do not simply
praise a single product; they evaluate one product with reference to an-
other. Such comparisons help the consumer choose between available
products.'1 0 In this respect, comparative advertisements may be as valu-
able as independent reports comparing products,"' and thus may gener-
ally be entitled to greater first amendment protection than other
advertisements."12
first amendment] is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients .. "). The plaintiffs
were consumers of prescription drugs. Id. The Court recognized their right to receive advertising
about those drugs. Id. at 756-57.
108. Id. at 771 n.24. Although this is true for much commercial speech, some advertisements
contain significant artistic expression. For example, some television commercials feature the music
of popular artists and display images similar to those contained in non-commercial music videos.
Such commercials often do not identify the product until near the end of the commercial.
109. Id. at 771-72 n.24. (Because an advertiser is better able to verify the accuracy of claims
about his own product than anyone else, and because advertisements are "the sine qua non of com-
mercial profits," proper regulation is not likely to chill the speech, thus making "it less necessary to
tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker.").
110. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. See also Nye, In Defense of Truthful Compara-
tive Advertising, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 353, 353 (1977) (Comparative advertising benefits consumers
by lowering prices and disseminating information freely; therefore "as long as the advertiser's claim
is true, his comparison may be disparaging, it may be derogatory, it may be downright nasty.").
111. Senator DeConcini observed that consumer reporting is not covered by section 43(a). 134
CONG. REc. S16973 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988).
112. The Supreme Court applies a balancing approach to determine whether speech is protected
by the first amendment, and, if protected, what degree of protection should apply. See Virginia
Citizens, 425 U.S. at 766 (balancing individual and societal interests against governmental interests
in banning advertising); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976) ("a differ-
ence in content [of protected speech] may require a different governmental response"). In Young,
the Court explained that sexually explicit movies, although constitutionally protected, receive lower
first amendment protection than other speech. Id. The Court stated, "Every schoolchild can under-
stand ... our duty to defend the right to speak .... But few of us would march our sons and
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2. The First Amendment and False or Misleading Commercial
Speech.
Although false speech receives protection in some contexts,1 13 demon-
strably false commercial speech is outside the realm of first amendment
protection. 114 The deceived consumer is not informed by false commer-
cial speech, and will be less likely to make an informed purchase deci-
sion. Therefore, competition to offer better quality at lower prices is not
enhanced by false commercial speech.
First amendment concerns are more prevalent in the context of mis-
leading commercial speech, because the revised section 43(a)'s prohibi-
tion of misleading advertisements may include literally truthful
statements.1 15 Although the Supreme Court has indicated that mislead-
ing commercial speech is not protected by the first amendment, 1 6 it is
not clear whether "misleading," as used by the Court, includes advertise-
ments intended to mislead consumers, those which actually mislead con-
sumers, or those that are merely likely to mislead consumers. 1 7
daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the
theatres of our choice." Id. at 70.
An example of commercial speech which receives lower first amendment protection is professional
advertising. See, eg., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) ("because the public
lacks sophistication concerning legal services, misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed
unimportant in other advertising may be found quite inappropriate in legal advertising").
113. The Supreme Court has long recognized that some false speech must be protected by the
first amendment to avoid chilling protected speech. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974) (in a defamation action involving a public figure, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's
false statements were made with actual malice before monetary damages are awarded; a non-public
figure plaintiff must prove at least negligence); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (court
may not enjoin defamatory speech prior to publication, even when the defendant "customarily"
publishes defamatory matter because such a restraint is the "essence of censorship").
114. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text for discussion of first amendment protection
of commercial speech.
115. For example, the statute may prohibit misleading omissions or unsubstantiated claims. See
supra notes 53-71 and accompanying text.
116. See, eg., Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980) (to fall within first amendment protection, commercial speech must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading). Accord Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983). But
see infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text. Central Hudson and Bolger both involved over-
breadth challenges to prohibitions of commercial speech. Such prohibitions are not deemed over-
broad if the plaintiff's speech is false or misleading. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. The Central
Hudson-Bolger analysis may not apply to section 43(a) cases because (1) the analysis applies only to
overbreadth challenges; and (2) section 43(a) grants injunctions and substantial monetary remedies,
thereby going farther than a prohibition.
117. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. In In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202 (1982),
the Court discussed regulation of speech that is "inherently likely to deceive or where the record
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Therefore, it is not clear when constitutional protection is removed from
literally truthful but "misleading" speech.
Courts may construe section 43(a) liberally to include advertisements
which fail to disclose material facts, or which make express or implied
claims without competent scientific substantiation.1"' If construed this
way, section 43(a) may impose liability on advertisers who are unaware
of material facts or unaware that known facts are material, and on adver-
tisers who reasonably rely on flawed scientific studies, or who uninten-
tionally imply that studies have been performed when they have not.' 19
Such an interpretation of section 43(a) could chill some advertising, par-
ticularly comparative advertising. For example, an advertiser may de-
cide to abandon a comparative advertising campaign out of fear that it
may inadvertently omit a material fact about the competitor's product.
Another advertiser may decide to use simple laudatory advertisements in
place of advertisements giving quality or performance information, fear-
ing an attack on the scientific basis for the claim. Some first amendment
protection should apply to prevent chilling these forms of commercial
speech. 120
B. The Standard of Protection
If courts conclude that the first amendment affords section 43(a) de-
fendants some protection, courts must then determine the standard of
protection. Courts can provide advertisers more protection by: (1) re-
quiring that the remedy imposed is the least restrictive means of prevent-
ing and eliminating deception and (2) requiring a showing of fault.
1. Least Restrictive Means of Preventing and Eliminating Deception
Although the Supreme Court has stated that Congress may prohibit
false and misleading commercial speech without violating the first
indicates that a particular form or method of advertising has in fact been deceptive." The Court's
definition of "misleading" probably does not apply in all contexts because R.MJ. involved profes-
sional advertising, which is subject to greater regulation than other types of advertising. See supra
note 113. Therefore, "misleading" in the context of non-professional advertising may be less inclu-
sive than the R.MJ. standard.
118. See supra notes 53-71 and accompanying text.
119. Damage awards are available upon a showing of either willfulness or actual consumer con-
fusion. See supra note 77. Therefore, damages may be awarded even in the absence of fault. See
supra note 49 and accompanying text.
120. If commercial speech is chilled, then the rationale for not protecting commercial speech as
vigorously as other speech no longer exists. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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amendment,12 the Court's holdings counsel against over-generalization.
For example, in In re R.M. ,22 the Court ruled that "[s]tates may not
place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading
information... if the information may be presented in a way that is not
deceptive."'' 23 The R.M.J Court observed that requiring a disclaimer or
explanation to prevent deception is preferable to prohibition.1 24  Thus,
R.M. suggests not only that misleading commercial speech receives
some first amendment protection, but also that restrictions on commer-
cial speech must not extend beyond that needed to prevent or correct
deception.
By allowing plaintiffs to recover treble damages, and the defendant's
profits, costs, and attorney's fees in exceptional cases,1 25 section 43(a)
extends beyond the means necessary to prevent and correct deception. A
defendant ordered to pay a large damage award may be unable to stay in
business, or unable to sell goods at the competitor's lower price.'26 Vig-
orous use of section 43(a)'s remedial provisions could have a chilling ef-
fect on speech that comes very near, yet does not fall within, that
proscribed by the section.127  In addition, large awards promote preda-
121. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
122. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
123. Id. at 203. R.M.J. struck down a Missouri Supreme Court Rule prohibiting lawyers from
listing areas of practice not within certain approved areas. The Court recognized that professional
advertising is an area especially susceptible to abuses that the states have a legitimate interest in
controlling, and that "the potential for deception and confusion is particularly strong in the context
of advertising professional services." Id. at 203. The Court explained that these dangers stem from
the public's lack of knowledge about professional services, the "absence of any standardization in the
'product,'" and the "limited ability of the professions to police themselves." Id. at 202. Despite
these dangers, the Court held that states may restrict professional advertising only when "it is inher-
ently misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse." Id.
at 203. See also infra note 124 and accompanying text.
124. R.M.1, 455 U.S. at 203. Despite the dangers of professional advertising, see supra note 123,
the R.MJ. Court ruled that "restrictions upon such advertising may be no broader than reasonably
necessary to prevent the deception." Id. at 203.
In Virginia Citizens, 425 U.S. at 771, the Court stated that it foresaw "no obstacle to a State's
dealing effectively" with deceptive or misleading commercial speech. A state can deal effectively
with such speech by complying with the least restrictive means rule. A more restrictive standard
creates the danger of chilling protected speech. See also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 702, 713
(1930) (state may not enjoin defamatory speech prior to publication where such a restraint is the
"essence of censorship.").
125. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 96. "Actual" damages under section 43(a) are necessarily difficult to calcu-
late because the monetary value of goodwill is difficult to measure and because plaintiffs need not
prove monetary loss to recover. See, eg., Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.,
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tory use of section 43(a).128
The availability of monetary damages does not necessarily render sec-
tion 43(a) more restrictive than needed to eliminate deception. For ex-
ample, when a plaintiff is forced to pay for advertising in order to correct
a false impression left by the defendant's advertising, 129 monetary dam-
ages are necessary to prevent ongoing deception. Moreover, awarding a
defendant's profits to a successful plaintiff removes the profit incentive to
engage in intentionally misleading advertising, and thus, is an effective
deterrent to purposeful deception. 130
Awarding monetary damages only when consumers are actually con-
fused13 1 is another means of assuring that section 43(a) is not more re-
strictive than needed. Even with this safeguard, however, the remedial
provisions of section 43(a) may be unnecessarily restrictive.1 32 The stat-
ute stipulates that remedies must consist of "compensation" only. 133
Construed literally, the statute may not extend beyond what is necessary
to prevent and correct deception.1 34
408 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Colo. 1976), aff'd as modified, 461 F.2d 1365, 1375-76 (10th Cir. 1977)
(affirming award of $678,000 actual and $4 million punitive damages without any evidence of eco-
nomic loss). Courts treat the cost of corrective advertising as actual damages. But cf Comment,
Money Damages and Corrective Advertising: An Economic Analysis, 55 U. CHi. L. REv. 629, 630
(1988) (authored by Paul Heald) (corrective advertising awards "are unjustified because they mis-
compensate plaintiffs, cause undesirable market behavior, and impose needless costs on businesses
and consumers").
128. See supra note 96.
129. Note, Damage Standards for False Advertising Under the Lanham Act: A New Trend
Emerges, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 125, 149 (1988) ("injunctions will not protect plaintiffs against suffering
the continuing effects of past false advertisements"). See also Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d
749, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (FTC required Warner-Lambert to include the statement, "Listerine will
not help prevent colds or sore throats or lessen their severity" in future advertisements to prevent
ongoing deception created by prior advertisements).
130. Comment, supra note 127, at 631 (defendant's profits are awarded as an estimate of the
plaintiff's lost profits, or on a theory of unjust enrichment).
131. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 127.
133. Lanham Act § 35 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1982 & Supp. 1989). The defendant's profits are
determined by the defendant's sales, less costs the defendant can prove. Id. The court may also
award "such sum as the court shall find to be just." Id.
134. Courts granted remedies liberally under the former section 43(a), and some fear a trend
toward larger awards under the new statute. See supra notes 127, 130, and 133. See also Comment,
supra note 127, at 630 ("the fear that courts will base damages on often substantial advertising
budgets adds a new and controversial factor which companies must consider in product marketing
and litigation decisions").
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2. Fault
Another way to prevent section 43(a) from chilling protected speech is
to require some showing of culpability on the part of the defendant as a
prerequisite to the recovery of monetary damages. To succeed in a defa-
mation action, a public figure must prove the defendant acted with actual
malice in order to recover monetary damages.135 Public figures are those
who voluntarily thrust themselves into the limelight. 36 Plaintiffs who
purchase advertising time to draw consumers' attention to their products
almost certainly fall within this definition.' 3 Although some businesses
do not purchase advertising, courts might conclude that a person who
offers goods or services to the public, or some segment of the public, is,
nonetheless, a public figure.' 3
Although the public figure doctrine traditionally requires a showing of
actual malice, courts may lower the standard to reflect the lower protec-
tion given commercial speech.'3 9 A negligence standard would afford the
defendant sufficient protection and avoid the chilling effect strict liability
could create."4 Such a requirement would also protect plaintiffs. Plain-
tiffs could demonstrate negligence by showing that the defendant unrea-
sonably made unsubstantiated assertions or omitted material facts. 141
135. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). When the plaintiff is not a public
figure, states are free to define the mens rea required so long as monetary damages are not recover-
able without a showing of at least negligence, and the amount of recovery is limited to actual dam-
ages when less than actual malice is shown. Id. at 347. The Gertz Court reasoned that speech about
a public figure plaintiff, such as a public official, has more social value than speech about a private
person or matter. Id. at 344-45. See also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S.
749, 749 (1984) (when defamatory statements do not involve a matter of public concern, presumed
and punitive damages are recoverable without a showing of actual malice).
136. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
137. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 492 (1984) (court
did not decide whether Bose Corporation's commercial activities made it a public figure).
138. Even if the plaintiff does not advertise, the information contained in advertising is a matter
of public interest. See supra notes 104-07, 136 and accompanying text. If an advertiser compares its
product to all other brands, and the claim is false as to one competitor with a small business (such as
an individual who produces goods at her home and distributes them locally), the plaintiff probably is
not a public figure.
139. Negligence is the standard required in a defamation action when the plaintiff is not a public
figure. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
140. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text. But see Caswell, Soldiers of Misfortune:
Holding Media Defendants Liable for the Effects of Their Commercial Speech, 41 FED. COMM. L.J.
217, 230 (1989) (arguing that even a negligence standard for a media defendant's liability for per-
sonal injury caused by its advertisements will chill protected speech).
141. See supra notes 53-71 and accompanying text. It is reasonable to expect an advertiser to
make an investigation before comparing its product to competing products in an advertisement. If a
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Such a standard would allow recovery for many plaintiffs, protect the
public from negligent advertising,142 and provide protection to the de-
fendant who innocently and reasonably makes a statement likely to mis-
lead consumers.
C Media Defendants
Because the first amendment specifically protects freedom of the
press, 143 courts are reluctant to impose civil liability upon media defend-
ants because sanctions may chill media coverage of controversial mat-
ters. 144 In the context of commercial speech, the concern is that holding
media defendants liable for misleading or false advertisements will dis-
courage the media's willingness to accept informational or comparative
advertising.1 45 Even worse, a large damage award could drive a media
defendant out of business, thereby silencing all its speech, not just its
commercial speech.1 4 6
The revised section 43(a)'s treatment of media defendants is troubling
in two respects. First, in order to avoid monetary damages, the media
defendant must establish the innocence of its violation.147 The Supreme
Court, however, consistently states that media defendants need not prove
the truth of their speech, 148 and courts are hesitant to impose monetary
failure to conduct a reasonable investigation results in material omissions or unsubstantiated claims,
the plaintiff could recover under a negligence standard.
142. For a discussion of the injury possible from negligent commercial speech, see Caswell, supra
note 140, and Case Comment, Consitutional Law-Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune and "Negligent
Advertising" Actions: Commercial Speech in an Era of Reduced First Amendment Protection, 64
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 157 (1989).
143. See supra note 99.
144. Caswell, supra note 140, at 230 ("Judges properly recognize that media defendants are
unique in two key respects: their business is speech, and their customary objective is to disseminate
that speech as widely as possible.").
145. See Case Comment, supra note 142 at 164 (courts generally require recklessness to hold a
media defendant liable for commercial speech in order to "restrict the scope of the publisher's
duty").
146. See Caswell, supra note 140, at 230 ("A relatively large award can easily threaten the finan-
cial viability of a publication.").
147. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
148. The Court observed in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964):
Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have consistently refused
to recognize an exception for any test of truth... and especially one that puts the burden
of proving truth on the speaker.... The constitutional protection does not turn upon 'the
truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered.'
Id. at 271 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963) (erroneous statements must be
protected so that free expression will have the "breathing space" necessary for its survival)).
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liability on media defendants for negligent commercial speech.149 The
second difficulty with section 43(a)'s treatment of media defendants is
that an innocent defendant is subject to an injunction15 ° even though the
first amendment forbids states from imposing liability without fault upon
media defendants in the context of defamation. 5
Although a media defendant's commercial speech is not entitled to the
same first amendment protection as its "core" speech,1 52 the press de-
pends on advertising revenues in order to deliver "core" speech at an
affordable cost.1 53 Therefore, if section 43(a) chills media willingness to
accept comparative or informational advertisements, it will also nega-
tively affect the availability of core speech.1
54
These concerns may rarely arise. Most plaintiffs will probably be more
interested in suing their competitors than in suing the press, so long as
the competitor is available for suit. 55 Further, media defendants with a
strictly business relationship with the party placing the advertisement
may be able to show their innocence without difficulty." 6 For them, an
injunction is not a particularly onerous remedy.' 57 Still, the statute al-
lows damage awards against media defendants; therefore, the first
amendment concerns may arise in some cases.
149. See supra note 145.
150. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
151. Injunctions are not available in defamation actions. See Near v. Minnesota, supra note
124. The Near rule, however, probably does not apply to commercial speech. Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24 (1976) (prohibition
against prior restraints may not apply in the context of commercial speech).
152. Virginia Citizens, 425 U.S. at 726-72 n.24 (states may regulate commercial speech more
strictly than core speech).
153. See, eg., Morrison, supra note 59, at 555 ("The leading United States advertiser spends
over $1.5 billion per year, and the typical nationally advertised brand is supported by millions of
dollars in print, television and promotional advertising.").
154. See supra note 146.
155. The innocent violation defense is available only to those "engaged solely in the business of
printing the ... violating matter for others." Lanham Act § 32(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) (Supp.
1989).
156. Although the rule against prior restraints, supra note 151, contemplates that silencing
speech is more restrictive than requiring the speaker to pay monetary damages, this is probably not
true in the context of paid advertisements. That is, the media would probably rather stop publishing
the advertisement than pay damages. If the media prints advertisements as a means of generating
revenues, it is unlikely that the media would continue publishing the advertisement after the adver-
tiser was enjoined from using the advertisement, so an injunction against the media defendant would
be unnecessary.
157. Although the Near Court regarded prior restraints of defamatory speech "the essence of
censorship," 283 U.S. at 713, one who publishes advertisements only for profit is clearly more inter-
ested in generating revenue than in conveying a heartfelt message. See supra note 156.
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When a section 43(a) suit is brought against a media defendant, courts
must be particularly cautious to assure that the remedy for misleading
speech does not chill protected speech. In such cases, the courts should
require a showing of at least negligence before awarding monetary
damages. 158
IV. CONCLUSION
The Trademark Law Revision Act modified section 43(a) to make
more advertisements actionable and more remedies available. The Act
offers greater relief to plaintiffs victimized by comparative advertisements
than was available at common law or under the former section 43(a).
Because the revised section may prohibit some literally true advertising
claims along with claims that are demonstrably false, courts must care-
fully construe the revised section so as to avoid chilling constitutionally
protected speech by advertisers and the media. The courts can achieve
this objective by awarding only remedies that are needed to correct and
eliminate deception, and by requiring a showing of fault for advertise-
ments that are misleading but not demonstrably false.
Sherry Gunn
158. Some courts may find that the first amendment requires a showing of recklessness before
media defendants may be subject to liability for damages. See supra notes 139-46 and accompanying
text.
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